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 INTRODUCTION 
This is an unprecedented lawsuit with far-reaching implications.  For the first time ever, the 
FTC is asking a federal court to hold that Section 5 of the FTC Act—a 1914 statute that prohibits 
“unfair and deceptive acts or practices”—authorizes the Commission to regulate the sophisticated 
technologies that businesses use to protect sensitive consumer information.  Large and small 
businesses already are subject to a dizzying array of federal statutes that establish data-security 
standards in specific sectors of the economy.  None of those statutes, however, apply in this case.  
Notwithstanding that statutory silence, the FTC argues that the general language of Section 5 gives it 
the broad authority to set data-security standards for any American business operating in any 
industry.  No court has ever held that Section 5 gives the FTC such unbounded authority.   
Hacking is an endemic problem.  Media stories routinely appear about cyberattacks on 
private companies, including Facebook, Google, Apple, Citibank, Microsoft, Sony, and many others, 
as well as government entities such as the CIA, DOD, NASA, FBI, and the FTC itself. The 
hospitality industry has not been immune to such attacks.  From 2008 to 2010, cybercriminals 
(allegedly from Russia) three times hacked into Wyndham Hotel and Resorts LLC’s (“WHR’s”) 
computer network and the separate computer networks of several independently owned hotels 
licensed to use the “Wyndham Hotels” brand.  WHR at the time had substantial security measures in 
place to protect its network against being hacked, and in response to the attacks, WHR alerted law 
enforcement agencies, retained computer forensic experts, and implemented significant remedial 
measures.  To WHR’s knowledge, no hotel guest suffered financial injury as a result of these crimes, 
and the cybercriminals responsible for the attacks have never been apprehended (or even seriously 
pursued) by law enforcement officials. 
To address pressing concerns of cybersecurity, Congress and the President have made 
substantial efforts to enact laws that would establish specific data-security standards for the private 
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sector.  Just last year, a comprehensive data-security law, the Cybersecurity Act of 2012, failed to 
pass the Senate despite extensive negotiations among the President, legislators, and scores of interest 
groups.  In response, the President in February 2013 issued an Executive Order and a Presidential 
Policy Directive on cybersecurity issues, which require the development of minimum data-security 
standards for businesses operating critical-infrastructure systems or assets.  In stark contrast to the 
FTC’s approach to regulation in this case, however, the Executive Order requires the formulation of 
specific data-security standards far in advance of any regulatory enforcement efforts and after an 
open public comment and review process.  For its part, Congress has continued to pursue 
cybersecurity legislation.  Just last week the House of Representatives passed an entirely new 
cybersecurity bill, the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, which now is pending before 
the Senate Intelligence Committee. 
The FTC is not waiting for the political process to determine the proper scope and contours 
of cybersecurity regulation.  Notwithstanding that WHR was a victim of hacking, and 
notwithstanding the substantial data-security efforts WHR undertook both before and after attacks, 
the FTC brought this unprecedented lawsuit against WHR, claiming that the company—as opposed 
to the hackers themselves—should be held responsible for the attacks.  Although no specific statute 
grants the FTC authority to establish and enforce data-security standards for the private sector, the 
Commission claims that such authority can be found in Section 5’s general prohibition on “unfair 
and deceptive” trade practices—a provision that has traditionally been understood to forbid certain 
dishonest or unscrupulous business practices.  WHR does not dispute that the FTC can bring 
enforcement actions against companies that make “deceptive” statements to consumers.  But in this 
case the Commission is attempting to do much more than that.  Relying on Section 5’s prohibition 
on “unfair” trade practices, the FTC argues that it has the statutory authority to do what Congress has 
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refused: establish data-security standards for the private sector and enforce those standards in federal 
court. 
That is an untenable theory of agency jurisdiction.  The Supreme Court has consistently 
refused to construe broad and open-ended statutory language—such as the “unfairness” prohibition 
in Section 5—as empowering administrative agencies to impose sweeping new requirements on 
American businesses.  “[Congress] does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”  
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).  That is particularly true when 
Congress, as it has done with respect to data security, “has spoken subsequently and more 
specifically to the topic at hand” by enacting more targeted legislation.  FDA v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 143 (2000).  Congress has enacted no fewer than 10 federal statutes 
expressly authorizing particular agencies to establish data-security standards in certain narrow 
sectors of the economy.  None of those laws grant the FTC the sweeping power to set data-security 
standards in all sectors of the economy.  To the contrary, that statutory landscape only confirms that 
Section 5 should not be interpreted to grant the FTC a general police power over data-security 
matters.  As one former government official recently explained, “[u]sing consumer protection laws 
to address cyber vulnerabilities is stretching the FTC’s mission beyond recognition.”  Michael 
Chertoff, The Lesson of Google’s Safari Hack, Wall Street Journal (July 22, 2012), available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303933704577532572854142492.html. 
The FTC itself previously agreed that it lacked the very authority that it purports to wield in 
this case.  On multiple occasions in the 1990s and early 2000s, the FTC publicly acknowledged that 
it lacked authority to prescribe substantive data-security standards under Section 5.  For that very 
reason, the FTC has repeatedly asked Congress over the past decade to enact legislation giving it 
such authority.  Although Congress never granted that request, the FTC “decided to move forward 
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on its own without any new, specific privacy laws or delegation of authority from Congress.”  M. 
Scott, The FTC, The Unfairness Doctrine, and Data Security Breach Litigation: Has The 
Commission Gone Too Far?, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 127, 143 (2008). 
The FTC’s approach to data-security regulation in this case only confirms that the 
Commission has neither the expertise nor the statutory authority to establish data-security standards 
for the private sector.  The FTC has not published any rules or regulations that might provide the 
business community with ex ante notice of what data-security protections a company must employ to 
comply with Section 5.  See, e.g., id.  at 143-144 (there are no “rulemaking proceedings, policy 
statements or guidelines from the Commission explaining what conduct … it deems ‘unreasonable,’ 
and hence actionable”).  Instead, the FTC is enforcing its vision of data-security policy through this 
selective, ex post enforcement action, which seeks to hold WHR liable for violating the FTC Act 
without any fair notice as to what data-security protections that Act supposedly requires.  Indeed, 
after a two-year investigation into WHR’s data-security practices, the FTC is unable to allege 
anything more specific than that WHR failed to employ protections that were “reasonable,” 
“appropriate,” “adequate,” or “proper.”  The FTC’s inability or unwillingness to state precisely what 
WHR did wrong—or tell others in the business community what they must do to avoid similar 
lawsuits in the future—confirms that the Commission has no business trying to regulate data-security 
practices under the FTC Act. 
At a fundamental level, the central question here is whether the Government can maintain an 
enforcement action in this case despite not having any specific delegation from Congress, despite 
having previously conceded that it lacks authority to regulate data security, and despite not having 
published any rules or regulations providing fair notice of what conduct is prohibited.  That 
approach, if accepted, would subject businesses to vague, unpublished, and uncertain requirements 
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that would drastically alter the regulatory landscape—without Congress or the President actually 
settling the debate about the proper scope of data-security regulation.  For these reasons, and for 
those explained below, the FTC’s Amended Complaint should be dismissed. 
BACKGROUND 
WHR is a hospitality company that provides services to independent hotels operating under 
the “Wyndham Hotels” brand name (the “Wyndham-branded hotels”), a full-service hotel chain with 
over 70 locations in the United States.  Am. Compl. ¶ 9.  With few exceptions, each Wyndham-
branded hotel is independently owned by a third party unaffiliated with WHR or the other 
defendants.  Id.  Most of those independent owners are authorized to use the “Wyndham Hotels” 
brand name pursuant to franchise agreements with WHR, through which WHR licenses the use of 
the brand name and agrees to provide services to the franchisee, who retains day-to-day 
responsibility for the hotel.  Id.  Other independent owners entered into management agreements 
with Wyndham Hotel Management, Inc. (“WHM”), under which WHM agrees to manage the 
property as the agent of the independent owner.  Id. ¶ 10. 
WHR maintains and operates a computer network that it uses to provide services to the 
Wyndham-branded hotels.  Id. ¶ 16.  Each Wyndham-branded hotel also maintains and operates its 
own computer network that is separate from, but linked to, WHR’s network.  Id. ¶ 15.  On three 
occasions from 2008 to 2010, criminal hackers gained unauthorized access into WHR’s computer 
network and into the separate computer networks of several Wyndham-branded hotels.  Id. ¶ 25.  
The intrusions into the Wyndham-branded hotels’ networks may have resulted in the hackers 
stealing payment card data that the independent hotel owners had collected from their guests.  Id.  
Significantly, the FTC does not allege that the hackers stole (or even had access to) any payment 
card data collected by WHR. 
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The FTC alleges that WHR violated Section 5 of the FTC Act by not maintaining 
“reasonable and appropriate” data-security protections.  Id. ¶ 1.  Although no court has ever 
construed Section 5 to apply to a private company’s data-security practices, the FTC advances two 
legal theories for its novel construction of the Act.  Count I relies on Section 5’s prohibition on 
“decepti[ve]” practices and alleges that WHR deceived consumers by stating on its website that it 
used “commercially reasonable efforts” to secure payment card data that it collected.  Id. ¶¶ 21, 44-
46.  Count II alleges that WHR’s data-security protections amounted to “unfair” trade practices 
under Section 5 because those practices were not “reasonable and appropriate.”  Id. ¶¶ 47-49. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
WHR brings this motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) , which requires 
dismissal if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  To survive a 
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) , “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 
as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 
(2009) (quotations omitted).  This “plausibility” determination is a “context-specific task that 
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”  Matthews v. 
Carson, 2010 WL 572101, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 17, 2010) (quotations omitted).  A plaintiff’s 
obligation to cross the plausibility threshold “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). 
ARGUMENT 
This case is a classic example of agency overreach.  The Supreme Court has warned time and 
again that, “[r]egardless of how serious the problem an administrative agency seeks to address, … it 
may not exercise its authority in a manner that is inconsistent with the administrative structure that 
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Congress enacted into law.”  Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 125 (quotations omitted).  The FTC’s 
Count II unfairness claim—which this brief addresses first—stretches far beyond the traditional 
bounds of the Commission’s authority.  Nothing in the text or history of Section 5 purports to give 
the FTC authority to decide whether data-security protections are “unfair,” and Congress’s repeated 
enactment of specific data-security statutes (and failed attempts to enact comprehensive data-security 
laws) confirm that the statute cannot be construed so broadly.  Simply put, Section 5’s prohibition on 
“unfair” trade practices does not give the FTC authority to prescribe data-security standards for all 
private businesses. 
The FTC’s Count I “deception” claim—which relies exclusively on certain statements in 
WHR’s online privacy policy—must also be dismissed.  The only information allegedly 
compromised during the criminal cyber attacks was certain payment card data collected by 
independent Wyndham-branded hotels—no data collected by WHR was ever placed at risk.  
Numerous sections of the privacy policy make abundantly clear that WHR made no representations 
at all about the security of data collected by the independent Wyndham-branded hotels.  And to the 
extent the FTC purports to allege that WHR’s representations regarding its own data-security 
practices were deceptive, those allegations fall well short of bedrock federal-pleading requirements. 
I. THE COUNT II UNFAIRNESS CLAIM MUST BE DISMISSED 
A. The FTC’s Unfairness Authority Does Not Extend To Data Security 
Enacted in 1914, Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits “unfair … acts or practices in or 
affecting commerce.”  15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).  In delegating authority to the FTC to enforce that 
provision, Congress clearly did not authorize the FTC to regulate anything and everything that the 
Commission might deem “unfair.”  See, e.g., Scientific Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 124 F.2d 640, 644 (3d Cir. 
1941) (holding that Section 5 does not authorize the FTC to regulate publications “concerning an 
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article of trade by a person not engaged or financially interested in commerce in that trade,” because 
otherwise “the Commission would become the absolute arbiter of the truth of all printed matter”).  
To the contrary, the scope of Section 5 is necessarily limited by that provision’s “place in the overall 
statutory scheme” and by common understandings as to the “manner in which Congress is likely to 
delegate” significant policy decisions to administrative agencies.  Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 
133 (quotations omitted). 
The overall statutory landscape strongly suggests that the “unfair … acts or practices” 
language in Section 5 of the FTC Act should not be interpreted to empower the FTC to establish 
data-security standards for the private sector.  When the FTC Act was first enacted in 1914, the 
statute might well have had “a range of plausible meanings.”  Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 143.  
“Over time, however, subsequent acts [have] shape[d] or focus[ed] those meanings.”  Id.   In 
particular, it is a well-established cannon of statutory construction that “where the scope of [an] 
earlier statute is broad but … subsequent statutes more specifically address the topic at hand,” the 
“later federal statute[s] should control [a court’s] construction of the [earlier] statute.”  Id. 
(quotations omitted); see also id. at 133 (“[T]he meaning of one statute may be affected by other 
Acts, particularly where Congress has spoken subsequently and more specifically to the topic at 
hand”); see also United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453 (1988) (“[T]he implications of a statute 
may be altered by the implications of a later statute.”).  Courts thus recognize that the later 
enactment of more-specific statutes targeting the subject matter at issue controls the interpretation of 
an earlier general statute.  See, e.g., Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 143 (Congress’s later 
enactment of tobacco-specific statutes foreclosed the FDA from exercising jurisdiction over tobacco 
products under the general provisions of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”)); Nutritional 
Health Alliance v. FDA, 318 F.3d 92, 102 (2d Cir. 2003) (Congress’s later enactment of statutes 
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“specifically targeted [at] the problem of accidental poisoning of children” foreclosed the FDA from 
assuming jurisdiction over poison-prevention packaging under the general provisions of the FDCA). 
That rule of statutory interpretation applies in this case and requires that the FTC’s unfairness 
claim be dismissed.  Since the FTC Act was enacted, Congress has enacted a vast array of laws that 
specifically authorize particular federal agencies to establish minimum data-security standards in 
narrow sectors of the economy.  For example:    
• The Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), Pub. L. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1953, codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., imposes requirements for the collection, disclosure, and disposal of 
data collected by consumer reporting agencies and requires the FTC and other agencies to 
develop rules for financial institutions to reduce the incidence of identity theft. 
• The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”), Pub. L. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 6801 et seq., mandates data-security requirements for financial institutions and 
instructs the FTC and federal banking agencies to establish standards for financial 
institutions “to protect against unauthorized access to or use of such records or 
information.”  15 U.S.C. § 6801(b)(3). 
• The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”), Pub. L. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2581-
728, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6501 et seq., requires covered website operators to establish 
and maintain reasonable procedures to protect the confidentiality and security of 
information gathered from children. 
• The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”), Pub. L. No. 
104-191, codified at 45 U.S.C. § 1320d et seq., requires health care providers to maintain 
security standards for electronic health information. 
• The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (“HITECH 
Act”), Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 17921 et seq., requires 
regulated entities to provide notice of unsecured breaches of health information in certain 
circumstances and strengthens protections for such data. 
• The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 
Stat. 1460, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 551, requires cable companies to take steps to prevent 
unauthorized access to certain subscriber information.1 
                                                 
1 These laws are only the tip of the iceberg.  See also, e.g., Video Privacy Protection Act, Pub. L. 100-
618 (1988); Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322;  Computer Fraud Abuse Act of 
1986, codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 et seq. 
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Those later-enacted statutes, all of which are specifically focused on data-security issues, “shape or 
focus” the meaning of Section 5 of the FTC Act, Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 143, and 
preclude any interpretation of Section 5 that would give the FTC general authority to set data-
security standards. 
Significantly, several of these laws, including the FCRA, GLBA, and COPPA, explicitly 
grant the FTC authority to regulate data security—but only in certain specific, limited contexts.  
Those statutes are powerful evidence that the FTC lacks general authority under Section 5 to regulate 
data-security practices in cases (like this one) that fall outside the confines of those narrow 
delegations.  Indeed, if Section 5’s prohibition on “unfair … acts or practices” granted the FTC the 
broad authority it claims in this case, the specific delegations of authority to the FTC in the FCRA, 
GLBA, and COPPA would have been entirely superfluous.  By delegating certain limited authority 
to the FTC to regulate data security in narrow sectors of the economy, Congress has foreclosed any 
interpretation of Section 5 that would give the Commission overarching authority to set data-security 
standards for all businesses operating in all industries. 
Indeed, until quite recently, the FTC specifically disclaimed the authority to regulate data 
security under Section 5’s “unfair … practices” language.  In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the 
Commission repeatedly stated that it “lack[ed] authority to require firms to adopt information 
practice policies,” FTC, Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the Electronic Marketplace, 
(hereinafter, “2000 Privacy Report”), at 34 (2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/
privacy2000/.pdf, and that its authority over data-security matters was “limited ... to ensuring that 
Web sites follow their stated information practices,” Consumer Privacy on the World Wide Web, 
Hearing before H. Comm. on Commerce, Subcomm. on Telecomm., 105th Cong., at n.23. (July 21, 
1998), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1998/07/privac98.htm; see also Scott, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 
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at 130-31 (“In its 2000 Report, the Commission indicated that … it could not require companies to 
adopt privacy policies.”).  As put by an FTC official in 2001, “‘[t]he agency’s jurisdiction is (over) 
deception…. If a practice isn’t deceptive, we can’t prohibit them from collecting information.  The 
agency doesn’t have the jurisdiction to enforce privacy.’”  Jeffrey Benner, FTC Powerless to Protect 
Privacy, Wired, May 31, 2001 (quoting Lee Peeler, former Associate Director of Advertising 
Practices at the FTC). 
The FTC’s self-professed lack of power to regulate data security through Section 5’s 
“unfairness” language is precisely why the FTC has for over a decade asked Congress to enact 
broader legislation giving the Commission the very authority it purports to wield in this case.  See, 
e.g., FTC, Privacy Online at 36-37 (asking Congress to enact legislation requiring websites to “take 
reasonable steps to protect the security of the information they collect from consumers” and 
“provid[ing] an implementing agency with the authority to promulgate more detailed standards 
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act”); see also Prepared Statement of the FTC on Data 
Security: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 112th Cong. 11 (May 4, 2011) 
(“[T]he Commission reiterates its support for federal legislation that would  (1) impose data security 
standards on companies and (2) require companies, in appropriate circumstances, to provide 
notification to consumers when there is a security breach.”); Data Security: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 112th Cong. 11 (June 15, 2011) (same). 
For good reasons, courts are generally reluctant to adopt a construction of a statute that the 
agency itself previously disclaimed.  See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 144 (refusing to construe 
the FDCA as authorizing the FDA to regulate tobacco products because, inter alia, the FDA had 
made “consistent and repeated statements that it lacked authority under the FDCA to regulate 
tobacco”).  While agencies are certainly free to change their mind, see FCC v. Fox Television 
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Stations Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 514-15 (2009), “[a]n agency interpretation of a relevant provision which 
conflicts with the agency’s earlier interpretation is entitled to considerably less deference than a 
consistently held agency view,” INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 447 n. 30 (1987).  At the 
very least, the agency must give a “reasoned explanation” for its change in position and “show that 
there are good reasons for the new policy.”  Fox Television, 556 U.S. at 515.  Here, however, the 
FTC has provided no reasons at all for why, despite its earlier assertions to the contrary, Section 5 of 
the FTC Act should be construed to permit the Commission to establish data-security standards for 
the private sector.  Because it has failed to meet its “burden of rationally explaining its departure 
from its previous position,” this Court should reject the FTC’s novel interpretation of Section 5.  Pa. 
Fed’n of Sportsmen’s Clubs, Inc. v. Kempthorne, 497 F.3d 337, 351 (3d Cir. 2007) (rejecting 
Department of Interior’s interpretation of its own regulations because it failed to reasonably explain 
its change in position). 
Courts must also “be guided to a degree by common sense as to the manner in which 
Congress is likely to delegate a policy decision of such economic and political magnitude to an 
administrative agency.”  Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 133.  Establishing substantive data-
security standards for private companies has been a topic of intense debate among members of 
Congress, the Executive Branch, interest groups, and relevant stakeholders.  In a very high-profile 
and well-publicized debate, Congress recently considered (and rejected) the Cybersecurity Act of 
2012, S. 2105, 112th Cong. (Feb. 14, 2012), which would have created comprehensive 
“cybersecurity performance requirements” for the private sector.  Id. § 104.  Just last week, the 
House of Representatives passed the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA), H.R. 
624, 113th Cong. (Apr. 18, 2013), a bill that aims to enhance cybersecurity practices by allowing 
private businesses and federal agencies to share cybersecurity information with one another.  That 
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legislation abandons any attempt to create comprehensive cybersecurity performance requirements.  
And it would grant immunity to private businesses that share information about cybersecurity 
threats, including attacks on their own networks, with the federal government.  Id. § 3(a) (providing 
“[n]o civil or criminal cause of action shall lie or be maintained in Federal or State court” in those 
circumstances).  This legislative language is irreconcilable with the FTC’s assertion that Congress 
wants the Commission to regulate private-sector data security through Section 5 of the FTC Act. 
Indeed, in light of the important economic and political considerations involved in 
establishing data-security standards for the private sector, and the intense political debate that has 
surrounded efforts to establish such standards, it defies common sense to think that Congress would 
have delegated that responsibility to the FTC—particularly through a 1914 statute that does nothing 
more than forbid “unfair” practices.  “Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of 
such economic and political significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion.”  Brown & 
Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160.  Applying a similar intuition, the Supreme Court has consistently 
refused to construe ambiguous and open-ended statutory provisions as empowering administrative 
agencies to impose sweeping new regulations on American businesses.  See, e.g., Gonzales v. 
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 267 (2006) (rejecting the “idea that Congress gave the Attorney General such 
broad and unusual authority through an implicit delegation”); Whitman, 531 U.S. at 468 (stating that 
it is “implausible that Congress would give to the EPA through … modest words the power to 
determine whether implementation costs should moderate national air quality standards”); MCI 
Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994) (the FCC’s power to “modify” 
requirements in the communications laws does not include the power to make “radical or 
fundamental” changes to regulatory requirements).  
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In the end, this case is analogous to Brown & Williamson, in which the Supreme Court 
rejected the FDA’s attempt to regulate tobacco products under the FDCA.  529 U.S. 120.  Like the 
FTC here, the FDA had previously taken the position that the FDCA did not give it authority to 
regulate tobacco products.  See id. at 145-46, 153-55.  Like here, Congress “considered and rejected 
several proposals to give the FDA the authority to regulate tobacco”—authority the FDA later tried 
to claim through agency action.  Id. at 147, 153-55.  And like here, Congress ultimately settled on “a 
less extensive regulatory scheme” and passed narrowly tailored legislation.  Id. at 148.  Under these 
analogous circumstances, the Court concluded that Congress’ more narrowly tailored legislation 
“ha[d] effectively ratified the FDA’s previous position that it lack[ed] jurisdiction.”  Id. at 156.  
There is no stronger basis for the FTC to claim authority to regulate data-security in this case than 
there was for the FDA to claim authority to regulate tobacco in Brown & Williamson.   
Data security is undoubtedly an important issue.  But “no matter how important … the issue, 
an administrative agency’s power to regulate in the public interest must always be grounded in a 
valid grant of authority from Congress.”  Id. at 161.  Here, Congress has indicated that the FTC’s 
authority to regulate “unfair” trade practices under Section 5 does not extend to creating data-
security standards that every business in America must obey.  The FTC’s Count II  unfairness claim 
therefore should be dismissed. 
B. The FTC Failed To Provide Fair Notice Of What Section 5 Requires 
Even if Section 5 did give the FTC authority to mandate data-security standards for the 
private sector, WHR cannot be held liable through this ex post enforcement action.  The Constitution 
forbids the United States from punishing private citizens and businesses for failing to follow 
standards of conduct of which the Government failed to provide fair notice.  See Vartelas v. Holder, 
132 S.Ct. 1479, 1486 (2012) (noting “the Ex Post Facto Clause, the Contracts Clause, and the Fifth 
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Amendment’s Due Process Clause” all embody the doctrine that new laws should not govern 
“transactions or considerations already past” (quotations omitted)).  Because the FTC has not 
published any rules, regulations, or other guidelines explaining what data-security practices the 
Commission believes Section 5 to forbid or require, it would violate basic principles of fair notice 
and due process to hold WHR liable in this case. 
“A fundamental principle in our legal system is that laws which regulate persons or entities 
must give fair notice of conduct that is forbidden or required.”  FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 
132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012).  Administrative law has “thoroughly incorporated” this constitutional 
“fair notice” requirement to limit agencies’ ability to regulate past conduct through after-the-fact 
enforcement actions.  General Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1328-29 (D.C. Cir. 1995).  
Specifically, although agencies have some discretion to make law through enforcement actions, see 
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974), agencies generally cannot use enforcement 
actions simultaneously to make new rules and to hold a party liable for violating the newly 
announced rule, see, e.g., Gates & Fox Co. v. OSHRC, 790 F.2d 154, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, 
J.).  Instead, to hold a party liable in an enforcement action, existing law must “state with 
ascertainable certainty . . . the standards” the agency expects parties to obey.  Dravo Corp. v. 
OSHRC, 613 F.2d 1227, 1232-33 (3d Cir. 1980) (emphasis added); General Elec., 53 F.3d at 1329.  
As the D.C. Circuit has recognized, these limits on agency power do nothing more than extend the 
“no punishment without notice” protections routinely afforded criminal defendants to other private 
actors the Government seeks to punish.  See General Elec., 53 F.3d at 1328-29. 
Two recent Supreme Court cases reaffirm the well-established rule that agencies cannot use 
enforcement actions to impose ex post liability on private citizens and businesses without having 
provided fair notice of what the law required.  In the first case, Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham 
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Corp., 132 S.Ct. 2156 (2012), the Court rejected the Department of Labor’s unexpected, after-the-
fact interpretation of its own regulations offered in a class-action suit seeking money damages—an 
interpretation ordinarily entitled to substantial deference, see Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 
S.Ct. 871, 880 (2011).  In doing so, the Court rejected the argument that “regulated parties [must] 
divine the agency’s [position] in advance or else be held liable when the agency announces its 
[position] for the first time in an enforcement proceeding.”  Christopher, 132 S.Ct. at 2167-69.  In 
the second case, Fox Television, the Court set aside an FCC adjudicative order against two television 
broadcasters because the agency did not provide “fair notice of what was forbidden.”  132 S. Ct. at 
2318.  
For decades, the Third Circuit and other Courts of Appeals have similarly rejected agency 
attempts to impose liability for legal rules “the agency announces . . . for the first time in an 
enforcement proceeding.”  Christopher, 132 S.Ct. at 2168; see Dravo, 613 F.2d at 1232-33 (refusing 
to punish past conduct based on a newly announced agency interpretation of regulations where those 
regulations did not “state with ascertainable certainty” that they covered the challenged conduct); 
Fabi Construction Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 508 F.3d 1077, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (reversing liability of 
construction company because the agency failed to provide fair notice of what implementing 
regulations required); PMD Produce Brokerage Corp. v. Department of Agriculture, 234 F.3d 48 
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (reversing dismissal of administrative appeal because Department of Agriculture 
failed to provide fair notice of what its internal procedural rules required); Trinity Broadcasting of 
Florida Inc. v. FCC, 211 F.3d 618 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (reversing liability of broadcaster because FCC 
failed to provide fair notice of what regulations required); United States v. Chrysler Corp., 158 F.3d 
1350, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (reversing agency-ordered car recall because “the NHTSA failed to 
provide adequate notice” of what the law required); General Electric, 53 F.3d at 1333-34 (vacating 
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finding of liability because the EPA failed to provide a company with “fair notice” of what 
applicable regulations required). 
The FTC’s enforcement action in this case should be dismissed because the Commission 
never provided the “fair notice” that the Constitution and these cases require.  The text of Section 5 
itself clearly provides no meaningful notice to regulated parties—it generically prohibits “unfair and 
deceptive” business practices without going into any further detail as to what practices might be 
deemed “unfair” or “deceptive.”  15 U.S.C. § 45.  And making matters worse, the FTC has published 
no rules or regulations at all explaining what data-security practices a company  must adopt to be in 
compliance with the statute.  Thus, although the FTC’s complaint faults WHR (among other things) 
for using “inappropriate[]” software, firewalls, inventory procedures, and incident-response 
procedures, the FTC has previously provided no “fair notice” telling businesses what software they 
must use, how they must deploy firewalls, what inventory procedures they must adopt, and what 
procedures they should follow in the event of a breach.  The result is that businesses are left to guess 
as to what they must do to comply with the law.  They must, in the Supreme Court’s words, “divine 
the agency’s [position] in advance or else be held liable when the agency announces its [position] for 
the first time in an enforcement proceeding.”  Christopher, 132 S.Ct. at 2168;  see also E.I. du Pont 
de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 138-39 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding the FTC “owes a duty to 
define the conditions under which conduct . . . would be unfair so that businesses will have an 
inkling as to what they can lawfully do rather than be left in a state of complete unpredictability”).  
That is precisely what due process does not allow. 
The President, perhaps recognizing the FTC’s “sue now, offer guidance later” approach is 
bad policy and unconstitutional, eschewed that approach to data-security regulation in his February 
12, 2013 Executive Order on Improving Cybersecurity for Critical Infrastructure.  See Exec. Order 
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No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11739 (Feb. 12, 2013)  (“Executive Order”) (Hradil Decl., Ex. B); 
Presidential Policy Directive 21, Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (Feb. 12, 2013)  
(attached as Hradil Decl., Ex. C).  That Order requires the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (“NIST”) to lead the creation of a baseline set of standards for reducing cyber risks to 
critical infrastructure—what the Executive Order calls the “Cybersecurity Framework.”  The 
Cybersecurity Framework will establish a “set of standards, methodologies, procedures, and 
processes” for addressing cybersecurity threats, id., and will include “guidance for measuring the 
performance of an entity in implementing” those standards, id. § 7(b).  The Framework must also 
“provide a prioritized, flexible, repeatable, performance-based, and cost-effective approach” that 
includes specific “information security measures and controls” critical-infrastructure operators can 
implement to “identify, assess, and manage cyber risk.”  Id.  In developing the Cybersecurity 
Framework, the Director of NIST must “engage in an open public review and comment process.” Id. 
§ 7(d).  Compliance with the Cybersecurity Framework is initially “voluntary,” id. § 8(a), however 
federal agencies are directed to develop “incentives” to promote compliance and to assess whether 
“the agency has clear authority to establish requirements based on the Cybersecurity Framework,” 
id. § 10(a). 
Each of the steps the President’s Executive Order recognizes as necessary for effective and 
lawful data-security regulation is missing from the FTC’s approach.  The FTC has not issued any 
“standards, methodologies, procedures, [or] processes” for complying with Section 5, id. § 7(a); it 
has not established “guidance for measuring the performance of an entity in implementing” data-
security protections that might comply with the statute, id. § 7(b); it has not identified specific 
“information security measures and controls” that a business might adopt, id. § 7(b); and it has not 
“engage[d] in an open public review and comment process,” id. § 7(d).  Yet there is no reason the 
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same process the President has determined is necessary to regulate data security for critical 
infrastructure—a process that develops regulatory rules and standards before bringing enforcement 
actions seeking injunctions and millions of dollars—should become unnecessary when the FTC 
seeks to regulate data security in other sectors of the economy. 
C. Section 5 Does Not Govern The Security of Payment Card Data 
Even if Section 5 could be construed to give the FTC authority over some aspects of data 
security, the statute cannot be stretched so far as to authorize the FTC to regulate the type of data at 
issue in this case—consumer payment card information.  Under the statute, a practice can be found 
unfair only if it “causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not 
reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves.”  15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (emphasis added).  But, 
because of the special nature of payment card data, consumer injury from the theft of such data is 
never substantial and always avoidable.  Federal law places a $50 limit on the amount for which a 
consumer can be liable for the unauthorized use of a payment card.  See id. § 1643(a)(1)(B); see also 
Sovereign Bank v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 533 F.3d 162, 174 (3d Cir. 2008) (explaining that 
§ 1643 “creates a ceiling of $50 for cardholder liability for unauthorized charges”).  And all major 
card brands have adopted policies that waive liability for even that small amount.2   Consumers can 
thus always “reasonably avoid” any financial injury stemming from the theft of payment card data 
simply by having their issuer rescind any unauthorized charges.  15 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(1)(B) (“[O]nce 
a cardholder becomes aware of fraudulent activity on his/her account and notifies the card Issuer, 
                                                 
2 See Visa, http://usa.visa.com/personal/security/visa_security_program/zero_liability.html (“zero 
liability” for unauthorized card use); MasterCard, http://www.mastercard.us/zero-liability.html (same); 
Discover, http://www.discovercard.com/customer-service/fraud/protect-yourself.html (same); 
American Express, https://www.americanexpress.com/us/content/fraud-protection-center/purchase-
protection.html?vgnextchannel=9ee6d6954360c110VgnVCM100000defaad94RCRD&appinstancena
me=default (same) (all last visited Apr. 26, 2013). 
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that Issuer is obligated to reverse the charges, or credit the cardholder, for the amount of those 
fraudulent charges.”). 
The Third Circuit has recognized that the harm stemming from the theft of financial 
information often does not cause “substantial injury” to consumers.  In Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 
F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2011), hackers successfully accessed systems at a payroll-processing firm that 
stored sensitive financial information.  Individuals who had their financial information potentially 
compromised then brought suit against the payroll-processing firm, arguing that they had been 
injured by the theft of their data.  Id. at 40.  In affirming the dismissal of those claims, the Third 
Circuit held that the plaintiffs had not suffered an “injury-in-fact” from the data breach, and thus 
lacked constitutional standing to assert their claims.  Id. at 41.  The Court of Appeals explained that 
the plaintiffs could not show that the hacker was “able to use such [financial] information to the 
detriment of [plaintiffs] by making unauthorized transactions in [plaintiffs’] names.”  Id. at 42.  As 
the Third Circuit explained it, plaintiffs’ “credit card statements are exactly the same today as they 
would have been had Ceridian’s database never been hacked.”  Id. at 45.  The court also rejected the 
plaintiffs’ attempts to rely on the “time and money expend[ed] to monitor their financial 
information” to establish a substantial injury, explaining that such “speculative” expenses were not 
made “as a result of any actual injury.”  Id. at 46 (emphasis in original). 
What the Third Circuit said in Reilly is equally true here.  As in that case, consumers did not 
suffer any “substantial injury” from the cyberattacks on WHR.  In light of federal law and card brand 
rules concerning the theft of payment-card data, those consumers’ “credit card statements are exactly 
the same today as they would have been had [WHR’s] database never been hacked.”  Id. at 45.  And 
because they are not based on any “actual injury,” any incidental injuries that consumers suffered to 
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“monitor their financial information,” does not amount to the type of “substantial injury to 
consumers” required under section 45(n). 
Indeed, at least one former FTC Commissioner has taken the view that the FTC cannot use its 
“unfairness” authority to regulate most data-security practices because the consumer harm involved 
is “intangible.”  See Dissenting Statement of J. Thomas Rosch, Protective Consumer Privacy in an 
Era of Rapid Change, at C-4 (March 26, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326
privacyreport.pdf.  As Commissioner Rosch explained, use of the FTC’s “unfairness” authority in 
that fashion “goes well beyond what the Commission said in the early 1980s that it would do, and 
well beyond what Congress has permitted the Commission to do under Section 5(n).”  Id. at C-5.  
Adhering to that view, Commissioner Rosch dissented from the FTC’s decision to include an 
“unfairness” claim in its complaint in this case.3 
The illusory consumer harm in this case also underscores how much the FTC must twist 
Section 5 to bring an enforcement action against WHR.  WHR, unlike the consumers in this case, 
lost millions of dollars and suffered significant reputational harm when cybercriminals attacked its 
network.  Yet the FTC wants to turn a statute designed to protect consumers from unscrupulous 
businessmen, see FTC v. Freecom Commc’ns, Inc., 401 F.3d 1192, 1202 (10th Cir. 2005) (“The 
primary purpose of § 5 is to lessen the harsh effects of caveat emptor.”), into a tool to punish 
businesses victimized by criminals.  This is the Internet equivalent of punishing the local furniture 
store because it was robbed and its files raided.  Not only is this result senseless, it cannot be what 
Congress intended when it enacted Section 5.  See United States v. Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 800 
(1969) (“In our anxiety to effectuate the congressional purpose of protecting the public, we must 
                                                 
3 See FTC Press Release, FTC Files Complaint Against Wyndham Hotels (June 26, 2012), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/06/.shtm. 
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take care not to extend the scope of the statute beyond the point where Congress indicated it would 
stop.”). 
Even if Section 5 could be construed to mandate certain data-security requirements for 
payment card data, the standard of liability for failing to protect that data would be demanding and 
far above what the FTC has alleged in this case.  The requirements imposed by Section 5 must be 
balanced against the risk of consumer injury.  See 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).  And because the risk of 
consumer injury posed by the theft of payment card data is either non-existent or, at a minimum, 
exceedingly small, the standard of liability for failing to adequately protect such data would have to 
be correspondingly high.  That is precisely why courts examining data-security issues under state 
unfair-trade-practices statutes have held that such practices are unfair only when they are egregious 
or “reckless” in nature.  See, e.g., Worix v. MedAssets, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 893, 900 (N.D. Ill. 
2012).  The FTC does not allege such recklessness or egregiousness here. 
D. The Unfairness Count Fails Federal-Pleading Requirements. 
Finally, the Amended Complaint should be dismissed because it fails to satisfy basic 
pleading requirements.  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.  The Amended Complaint criticizes WHR for 
failing to employ practices that were “readily available,” “adequate,” “commonly-used,” and 
“proper.”  Am. Compl. ¶ 24.  But nowhere does the FTC give any factual detail as to what 
procedures, or combination of procedures, would have met those conclusory standards.  For 
example, the FTC alleges that defendants “failed to ensure the Wyndham-branded hotels 
implemented adequate information security policies,” id. ¶ 24(c), but never states what policies 
would be “adequate.”  It criticizes defendants’ operating systems as “outdated,” id. ¶ 24(d), but fails 
to allege what alternative systems would be current.  And it states that defendants “failed to employ 
reasonable measures to detect and prevent unauthorized access,” id. ¶ 24(h), but does not explain 
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what measures would be “reasonable”—now or when the alleged breaches occurred.  Simply put, the 
FTC’s allegations are nothing more than “legal conclusions couched as factual allegations” and do 
not state a plausible claim for relief.  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see Willey v. J.P. Morgan Chase, 
N.A., 2009 WL 1938987, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2009) (holding that data breach plaintiff failed to 
satisfy Twombly because his allegation of “unreasonable” data security was unsupported by “factual 
allegations” explaining  “how the procedures Chase adopted failed to comply with” the law). 
Even looking past the FTC’s conclusory allegations of “unreasonable” security, the 
Commission also has not adequately pleaded causation. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(n). The Amended 
Complaint contains no factual allegations showing how the alleged data-security failures caused the 
intrusions, or how the intrusions resulted in any particular consumer harm.  Instead, the FTC simply 
asserts without explanation that the intrusions were the “result” of WHR’s data-security program 
(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 25, 32) and that the intrusions then “resulted” in hackers stealing payment card 
information and making fraudulent charges (id. ¶¶ 36, 39, 40).  Such conclusory allegations of 
wrongdoing are exactly the kind of unadorned assertions that fail federal pleading requirements.  See  
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see also Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 75 (1st Cir. 2012) (data breach 
plaintiff failed to state claim under Twombly and Iqbal where he “ha[d] merely given lip service to 
the elements of causation and harm”).  After a two-year investigation into WHR’s data-security 
practices, surely the FTC should be required to say more about how the alleged vulnerabilities 
“result[ed]” in consumer harm. 
II. THE COUNT I DECEPTION CLAIM MUST BE DISMISSED 
The FTC’s Count I deception claim fares no better than its Count II unfairness claim.  To 
impose liability under the “deception” prong of Section 5, the FTC must identify (1) a 
representation; that (2) is “likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances;” 
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that (3) is “material.”  FTC v. Millennium Telecard, Inc., 2011 WL 2745963, at *6 (D.N.J. July 12, 
2011).  Because such a claim “sounds in fraud,” the FTC must meet the heightened pleading 
requirements of Rule 9(b) when alleging unlawful deception.  FTC v. Lights of Am., Inc., 760 F. 
Supp. 2d 848, 853 (C.D. Cal. 2010); FTC v. Ivy Capital, Inc., 2011 WL 2118626, at *3 (D. Nev. 
May 25, 2011).  But even applying general pleading standards, see, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, the 
FTC’s Count I deception claim must be dismissed.  “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause 
of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”  Id. at 663.   
The FTC alleges that WHR deceived consumers when it stated in its online privacy policy 
that WHR used “industry standard practices” and “commercially reasonable efforts” to protect the 
security of payment card data.  See Am. Compl. ¶ 21; see also Hradil Decl., Ex. A (containing the 
privacy policy in its entirety).4   In alleging that those statements were deceptive, however, the FTC 
relies primarily on allegations concerning the state of data-security at the Wyndham-branded hotels.  
The FTC thus points to a number of alleged “inadequate data-security practices” at the Wyndham-
branded hotels, see id. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24(a), 24(b), 24(c), 24(d), 24(f), 24(j), and three instances in 
which cybercriminals were able to access payment-card data collected and controlled by the 
Wyndham-branded hotels, see id. ¶¶ 25, 30-31, 34-35, 37. 
As a matter of law, allegations concerning the state of data-security at the Wyndham-branded 
hotels cannot support the FTC’s deception claim.  WHR and the Wyndham-branded hotels are 
legally separate entities that each maintain their own computer networks and engage in their own 
                                                 
4 “In evaluating a motion to dismiss, we may consider documents that are attached to or submitted 
with the complaint, and any ‘matters incorporated by reference or integral to the claim, items subject 
to judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, [and] items appearing in the record of the case.’” 
Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006)  (quoting 5B Charles A. Wright 
& Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1357 (3d ed. 2004) ). 
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data-collection practices.5  And by its plain terms, the WHR privacy policy makes representations 
only about the data-security practices at WHR and does not make any representations about data-
security practices at the Wyndham-branded hotels.  Thus, the privacy policy consistently uses the 
terms “we,” “us,” and “our” when making representations about WHR’s data-security practices, and 
specifically defines those terms to exclude the Wyndham-branded hotels.  Hradil Decl., Ex. A at 1.  
The policy also expressly caveats each representation about data-security by explaining that those 
representations apply only to “our collection” of data and only “to the extent we control the 
Information”—caveats that plainly exclude any data collected by the Wyndham-branded hotels.  Id.  
And if all of that were not enough, the privacy policy includes a separately-titled section—which the 
FTC conveniently omitted from its quotation of WHR’s privacy policy in the Amended Complaint—
that expressly disclaims making any representations about the security of payment-card data 
collected by the Wyndham-branded hotels: 
Our Franchisees. 
Each Brand hotel is owned and operated by an independent Franchisee that is 
neither owned nor controlled by us or our affiliates.  Each Franchisee collects 
Customer Information and uses the Information for its own purposes.  We do not 
control the use of this Information or access to the Information by the Franchisee and 
its associates.  The Franchisee is the merchant who collects and processes credit card 
information and receives payment for the hotel services.  The Franchisee is subject to 
the merchant rules of the credit card processors it selects, which establish its card 
security rules and procedures. 
Id. at 4.   
The bottom line is that any reasonable consumer, after reading the privacy policy “as a 
whole, without emphasizing isolated words or phrases apart from their context,” Millennium 
                                                 
5 As a franchisor, WHR collects payment card data through its centralized reservations service—
which permits guests to book hotel rooms either online or over the phone—and processes that 
information through its corporate network.  See Hradil Decl., Ex. A, at 2.  Separate and apart from 
WHR’s practices, each independently owned Wyndham-branded hotel collects payment card data 
and processes that data on its own local networks.  Id. at 4.  
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Telecard, 2011 WL 2745963), at *5 (quotations omitted), would have understood that the policy 
made statements only about data-security practices at WHR and made no representations about data-
security practices at the Wyndham-branded hotels.  The FTC’s allegations about the state of data 
security at the Wyndham-branded hotels thus do nothing to support its deception claim against 
WHR. 
WHR’s privacy policy—which makes clear WHR accepts responsibility only for its own 
actions, not those of its franchisees—is consistent with basic principles of franchise law.  A 
franchisee is “a limited independent contractor,” Lodbell v. Sugar & Spice, Inc., 658 P.2d 1267, 
1274 (Wash. 1983), which operates as an independent business separate and distinct from the 
franchisor, Southern States Co-Op, Inc. v. Global AG Assocs., Inc., 2008 WL 834389, at *4 n.5 
(E.D. Pa. March 27, 2008); In re Saxby’s Coffee Worldwide, LLC., 440 B.R. 369 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
2009).   Because a franchisor and its franchisees are independent businesses, a franchisor ordinarily 
is not responsible “for the acts and omissions of its franchisees.”  Martin D. Fern, Establishing and 
Operating under a Franchise Relationship § 1.04[C][3] (2000).  Courts deviate from this rule only 
when the franchisor exercises day-to-day control over the activities at the franchisee that caused the 
alleged harm.  See Capriglione v. Radisson Hotels Int’l, Inc., 2011 WL 4736310, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 
5, 2011) (dismissing tort suit against franchisor for injuries sustained at a franchisee’s hotel property 
because the franchisor “lacked both ownership interest in and control over the day-to-day operations 
of the Hotel”); Chen v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 2009 WL 3379946, at *4 (D.N.J. Oct. 16, 2009) 
(dismissing complaint asserting franchisor was liable to a franchisee’s employee for Fair Labor 
Standards Act because the franchisor did not “ha[ve] any authority or control over the[] employment 
conditions.”); Fern § 1.04[C][3] .  By disclaiming responsibility for data-security at the Wyndham-
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branded hotels, therefore, WHR’s privacy policy was doing nothing more than applying well-
established rules of franchise law. 
Recognizing that critical shortcoming in its deception case, the FTC makes a half-hearted 
attempt to allege that WHR made deceptive statements about its own data-security practices.  See 
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24(g), 24(h), 24(i).  But those allegations amount to nothing more than conclusory 
statements of wrongdoing that fall well short of establishing a “plausible” claim to relief.  Iqbal, 556 
U.S. at 678.  Thus, although the Amended Complaint alleges that WHR did not employ certain 
“adequate[],” “reasonable,” or “proper” practices, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24(g)-(j), those claims fall far 
short of what federal pleading standards require.  Whether a security standard is “adequate” or 
“reasonable” is a question of law, not of fact, and allegations as to the same are thus properly 
disregarded on a motion to dismiss.  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (courts are “‘not bound to accept as 
true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation’”) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 at 555 
(2007)).  In any event, the FTC makes no attempt to explain what those terms mean or what it 
believes would have been “adequate[],” “reasonable,” or “proper” in those specific contexts.  See, 
e.g., Seldon v. Home Loan Servs., Inc., 647 F. Supp. 2d 451, 461 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (dismissing 
complaint because “plaintiffs provide no allegation whatsoever as to how any of these fees qualify as 
unreasonable”).  
Furthermore, although the FTC’s deception allegations necessarily depend on the 
Commission proving that WHR’s data-security practices were not “industry standard” or 
“commercially reasonable,” the Amended Complaint contains no allegations at all explaining what 
data-security practices were “standard” in the hospitality industry in 2008 or how WHR’s data-
security practices fell short of that benchmark.  See Argueta v. U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60, 75 (3d Cir. 2011) (concluding that “like Iqbal, Plaintiffs failed to allege a 
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plausible [] claim” in part because “Plaintiffs themselves did not really identify in their pleading 
what exactly [defendants] should have done differently”).  That is a fatal omission: Absent 
allegations explaining what “industry standard” practices would have required in 2008, the Amended 
Complaint provides no basis for asserting that WHR’s privacy policy is deceptive. 
Perhaps most telling of all, the FTC does nothing to explain how the alleged deficiencies it 
identifies placed personal information collected by WHR at risk.  Indeed, the FTC nowhere even 
alleges that any intruder compromised (or had access to) data collected by WHR.  There is thus no 
basis in law or logic for pointing to the data breaches as evidence of “deceptive” practices by WHR.  
That fact, coupled with the barebones nature of the FTC’s allegations concerning the security of data 
collected by WHR, conclusively undermines any argument that the WHR privacy policy was 
somehow “deceptive.” 
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CONCLUSION 
 For these reasons, WHR respectfully requests that the Court dismiss the FTC’s amended 
complaint as a matter of law. 
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